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An Evolving State of Play? Exploring Competitive Advantages of State 
Assets in Proliferation Networks 
Dr. Daniel Salisbury, Centre for Science and Security Studies, King’s College London 
 
Abstract: Illicit procurement networks often target industry in developed economies 
to acquire materials and components of use in WMD and military programs. These 
procurement networks are ultimately directed by elements of the proliferating state 
and utilize state resources to undertake their activities: diplomats and missions, state 
intelligence networks, and state-connected logistical assets. These state assets have 
also been utilized to facilitate the export of WMD and military technologies in 
breach of sanctions. While used in most historic proliferation cases, their role has 
seen limited consideration in the scholarly literature. This article seeks 
systematically to contextualize state resources in proliferation networks, arguing 
that their use lies between state criminality and routine activity in support of 
national security. Considering the competitive advantages of these assets compared 
to similar resources available in the private sector, the article argues that 
nonproliferation efforts have caused states to change how they use these resources 
through an ongoing process of competitive adaptation.  
 
Keywords: illicit trade; proliferation networks; arms trade; Iran; North Korea 
 
Introduction 
As the number of countries willing to openly supply WMD-related technologies in state-to-
state transfers has declined, state WMD programs have sought to acquire WMD technology 
using illicit procurement networks.1 These are networks that target witting or unwitting 
industry in developed economies to acquire materials, components and know-how of use in 
these programs, often in breach of national regulation. While involving private sector actors 
–witting and unwitting suppliers, middlemen, financiers and shippers– these procurement 
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networks are ultimately directed by elements of the proliferating state, and therefore often 
utilize state resources to undertake their activities. These state-resources include diplomatic 
assets such as embassies, state intelligence networks, and logistical assets such as air force 
cargo planes. Beyond WMD procurement, these state assets have also been utilized to 
facilitate the import and export of WMD and military technologies in breach of sanctions, 
mostly to states, but also to non-state actors.  
 
The use of these assets is a key feature of many illicit proliferation networks. In recent 
years, some attention has been given to the use of these assets, especially embassies, by 
North Korea in their WMD procurement efforts. However, these assets have been used 
extensively in most historic cases. Furthermore, the role of these elements has not been 
considered in any conceptual way in the existing academic literature. This article seeks 
systematically to contextualize state resources in proliferation networks. After framing the 
issue, it proceeds by considering several factors which must be taken into account in 
considering a definition of state-resources, and argues that use of state resources in these 
networks lies between state criminality and their routine use by states in support of national 
security. The competitive advantages of utilizing state diplomatic, intelligence and 
logistical assets are considered, relative to similar services offered by the private sector. 
The changing value of these assets as a result of counterproliferation efforts is also 
considered. The paper concludes by considering tools and opportunities to disrupt state-
connected aspects of these networks.  
 
Proliferation Networks and State Resources: Existing Scholarly Work 
Proliferation networks conducting illicit procurement and sales are ultimately state-
directed, and therefore frequently have access to state resources. Recent North Korean 
activities illustrate the role state assets can, and frequently do, play. Most recently, in 2018 
a German intelligence official noted that the North Korean embassy in Berlin had been used 
to acquire missile and nuclear related dual use goods over the previous two years.2 In 2016 
an advertisement to sell Lithium-6, a substance used in thermonuclear weapons, was linked 
to an individual formerly listed as “third secretary” at the North Korean embassy in 
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Beijing.3 North Korean efforts to sell arms in breach of the UN embargo have also been 
traced back to North Korean intelligence agencies.4 State-owned and operated shipping 
companies and airlines in North Korea have also been designated or scrutinized for their 
role in WMD-related and arms transfers. However, the use of state assets and resources 
extends far beyond these recent North Korean examples. Despite their prominence in these 
networks, little work has considered this phenomenon in a conceptual or systematic 
manner.  
 
The existing academic literature on proliferation networks has only scraped the surface 
when it comes to conceptual discussion of network operations at the sub-state level. This 
literature has largely focused on the state-level, with states –suppliers and recipients– 
forming the “nodes”.5 More recently, scholarship has started to address the “transactional 
level”, focusing on the role of, and interactions between, organizations, companies, and 
individuals. However, this has largely focused on the drivers of behavior of private sector 
actors, or has considered private sector actors alongside those knowingly working for 
proliferating states.6  
 
At the transactional level, illicit trade is driven by demand. While it is the private sector 
which largely provides the technology to proliferation networks, the work of the 
middlemen who knowingly broker these illicit transactions, and the procurement 
requirements, are ultimately driven by the state programs they supply. Those elements of 
proliferation networks aware of the actual end user and uses of the technology being 
transferred are often state-connected, and frequently draw on state resources in their illicit 
transfers. Little attention has been given to these aspects of proliferation networks beyond 
cursory references in accounts of procurement for specific programs, and illicit trade more 
generally.7  
 
In broad terms, Bunn has considered the role that corruption and corrupt state and 
government officials can play in protecting proliferation networks from enforcement.8 
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Anderson has briefly discussed the opportunities and challenges regarding the use of 
embassies, diplomatic immunity and diplomatic conventions –specifically the use of 
diplomatic pouches– in the procurement of proliferation sensitive goods, although he does 
not contrast those with other state resources.9 Hastings’s valuable work provides the most 
extensive discussion, and makes the most significant conceptual contribution, discussing 
the role of “coordinators” in proliferation networks that have access to “state prerogatives 
and resources”.10 He argues that coordinators that have access to these resources:  
 
…can avoid setting up logistical support structures that are embedded in 
potentially hostile countries, while their control of their own means of 
transportation allows them to bypass legitimate commercial transportation 
infrastructure when they move goods.11  
 
Through providing contrasting, historic and inter-related case studies of Pakistan’s 
procurement network, which benefitted from use of state resources such as embassies, 
diplomatic personnel and military transport planes, and Khan’s Libya and Iran networks, 
which had to rely on some commercial infrastructure, he argues that access to resources is 
the “most important factor” in determining the geography of proliferation networks.12 In 
doing so, he portrays state resources as superior, increasing the certainty of successful 
transfers.13 He implies that actors with access to these state resources would inevitably 
decide to make use of them. This is likely true, given the widespread use by proliferating 
states. However, both state and commercial resources and their relative advantages merit 
systematic consideration to further our understanding of proliferation network behavior.  
 
The literature on the use of state resources in proliferation networks is also surpassed by a 
body of literature which discusses the role of states in illicit activities – from narcotics 
trafficking to wildlife crime. Much of this focuses on the illicit activities of specific states 
or elements of states, with much focusing on the illicit activities of North Korea.14 Some 
scholarship also considers how specific state resources have been mobilized towards these 
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ends.15 Despite great secrecy surrounding the activities of these networks, there is great 
scope to build upon this varied discussion to further understanding of the role and relative 
advantages of state resources in proliferation networks.  
 
Between the Criminal State and Routine Activity 
To frame better the role of state resources in proliferation networks, this section sets out to 
provide a conceptual background and definitions. The section first considers in-depth the 
definition of state resources, second it argues that the use of state resources in proliferation 
networks falls between state criminality and their routine use in legitimate national security 
activities, and third it introduces the concepts of “competitive advantage” and “competitive 
adaptation”. These lenses will be used in the following section to consider the merits of 
different state assets relative to elements of the private sector that can fulfil similar 
functions, and the overall changing utility of these resources to proliferators.  
 
Defining State Resources 
The “state resources” considered in this paper are loosely defined as those resources under 
the direct control of the state, as well as those under varying levels of state influence, 
mostly operating outside of the borders of the proliferating state itself. It should also be 
noted that this article focuses on those resources involved in the transfer of the goods 
themselves, rather than providing enabling services.16 Providing a definition of state 
resources is not simple given the multitude of differing national contexts. States that have 
utilized illicit trade to benefit their WMD programs have included dictatorships where 
many, if not close-to-all, activities within the country are overseen by the state (for example 
North Korea), those which have seen the development of an extensive private sector over 
recent decades (such as China), and democracies with market economies (for example India 
or Israel). 
 
A loose typology of state and quasi-state resources is proposed.17 Those listed in the left-
hand column of figure 1 are clearly state-controlled – and are largely drawn from three 
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areas: the state’s diplomatic, intelligence and military assets. Quasi-state resources listed in 
the right-hand column are not under such direct control of the government, but potentially 
still fall under state or government influence.  
 
Figure 1: State and Quasi-State Resources  
State Resources Quasi-State Resources 
Diplomatic: Embassies, 




networks and related assets. 
 
Logistical: transportation 
infrastructure, military and 
other state-controlled 
transportation assets. 
Industrial: state-owned or 
state-controlled procurement 
companies, manufacturers, 
their subsidiaries, and loyal 
middlemen. 
 




Logistical: state-owned or 
state-connected shipping 
companies and airlines. 
 
Quasi-state resources fall in a grey area that merits discussion in this section. The first two 
categories –“industry and “financial”– are not the focus of this article, mostly operating 
inside of the state procuring or exporting in the face of sanctions. “Industry” includes the 
state-connected industry actors involved in the procurement or sales of WMD-related and 
military goods. Procurement companies and their front companies based in the proliferating 
state are often directly linked to the WMD program and therefore arguably subject to a 
degree of government control. In some countries, the manufacturing base for strategic and 
military technologies is also closely linked to the state. These entities can also be involved 
in illicit procurement activities which benefits WMD programs. However, while technically 
“state-owned”, the day-to-day activities of these –often large and complex– organizations 




The middlemen or procurement agents operating overseas often form part of the private 
sector, although they can also have connections to the state – the degree to which this is the 
case varies. At the very least, procurement agents are privy to the state WMD program’s 
procurement requirements, either directly, or through proxy, viewing tenders and sending 
out “requests for quotes” to suppliers, although they may also be unaware of the end use. 
Many of these individuals also have other connections to the state –either being an agent of 
the proliferating state, having an ideological affiliation, or simply sharing nationality. Those 
involved in trading arms overseas in breach of sanctions can also have state connections, 
working for state-trading companies for example. However, there are also many examples 
of private sector middlemen being motivated purely by profit, having no affinity with the 
state, and even trying to overcharge those seeking to procure or broker the sale of 
proliferation-sensitive goods by taking a significant cut.   
 
Organizations providing enabling services such as financial services and transportation can 
also have connections to the proliferating state – also often bridging the realms of state-
ownership and control, and the private sector. State-owned banks have been sanctioned for 
their role in proliferation financing in the past. Quasi-state transportation assets have also 
alleged to have been involved in proliferation networks. The operations of these logistical 
assets are mostly outside of the borders of the proliferating state, and will be considered 
alongside other state assets below. Having considered definitional issues, the use of state 
resources needs conceptualization.   
 
Between State Criminality and Routine Activity   
The illicit trade that supplies WMD programs, and involves breach of arms embargos, can 
constitute criminal activity.19 How can this criminal activity best be contextualized? 
Beyond corruption and embezzlement, elements of states –government officials, members 
of legislatures, intelligence agencies and the military– have frequently been shown to be 
involved or have interests in transnational criminal activity.20 The term “criminal state”, a 
contested and broad concept, has been coined in the literature to describe a wide variety of 
states in which the government and other structures have been permeated by criminal 
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behavior.21 Miklaucic and Naim have broken down criminal states into a loose typology 
based on the extent of criminality– from “criminal penetration” of corrupt individuals in 
governmental structures and networks, “criminal infiltration” constituting penetration with 
a greater loss of legitimacy, “criminal capture” where the state has lost the ability to counter 
powerful embedded criminal networks, and finally “criminal sovereignty” where criminal 
activity becomes a core state mission and resisting complicity is futile.22  
 
The criminal activities in these criminal states are largely conducted for the personal 
financial gain of those involved. For example, corrupt government officials taking bribes, 
syphoning off funds, or using their position to facilitate personally enriching profitable 
illicit activities. However, "criminal sovereignty", the most extreme type, involves illicit 
activity undertaken as a part of, and to further, the policy of the state. North Korea is the 
most frequently given example of criminal sovereignty, with the state's activities being 
"unique in the contemporary international security arena", and involving the state 
effectively maintaining "the monopoly on the conduct of illicit activities".23 Crimes are 
committed "beyond the borders of North Korea by the regime itself, not solely for the 
personal enrichment of the leadership, but to prop up its armed forces and to fund its 
military programs".24  
 
North Korea's criminal sovereignty is driven, organized and facilitated by state resources. 
This state directed crime has been institutionalized within the ruling party through “Office 
39”, and has seen the use of assets not available to non-state actors such as "merchant and 
military vessels, diplomatic and embassy posts, as well as state run companies and 
collective farms".25 However, according to Chestnut, state oversight and control of North 
Korea's illicit activities has declined since the 1980s and 1990s, as the state has increasingly 
outsourced drug trafficking and other activities to criminal groups.26 
 
The increased use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool has resulted in the growth of 
sanctions-busting criminal activity, which is often tacitly welcomed or actively enabled by 
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sanctioned states and third country governments.27 These are efforts to undermine the 
effects of economic sanctions and other embargoes, often by smuggling goods to 
compensate for shortages or to make up for lost trade revenues more broadly. Efforts to 
bust sanctions, embargoes and circumvent economic measures are as old as these policy 
tools themselves.28 More recently, in his piece on the "criminalizing consequences of 
sanctions", Andreas has emphasized the role that states and government actors have in 
breaching sanctions, and the wider temporal and geographical effects.29  
 
While some states have mobilized state resources in support of illicit activities, all states 
have mobilized state resources in support of more “legitimate” national security and trade 
activities. This includes the support of intelligence efforts, procurement, purchase or sales 
of arms, and broader commercial diplomacy. States routinely use their resources such as 
embassies in support of intelligence activities.30 Declared intelligence officers are 
frequently stationed at embassies to support intelligence networks composed of undeclared 
"illegals" and their sources.  
 
“Commercial diplomacy” has been an increasingly important function for embassies and 
diplomatic personnel.31 This includes in civil commercial areas – obtaining market 
intelligence, facilitating trade missions and supporting companies from home, and 
negotiating bilateral commercial agreements—as well as trade in arms.32 The UN charter 
enshrines member states' right to self defence, and the procurement of arms to this end is 
normal and "legitimate".33 State resources and support is often mobilized to procure and 
export arms– for example, through use of embassies and intelligence agencies, provision of 
favorable financial assistance, support of promotion and marketing efforts at trade fairs and 
use of military personnel, existing military and defence relationships.34 In some sense, arms 
exports and procurement are a clear extension of foreign policy, the core mission which 




Therefore, it is argued that the states' use of these state assets in proliferation networks lies 
somewhere between state criminality and these routine national security and commercial 
activities. Essentially, while what is illegal or illicit is enshrined in national and 
international laws, what is "legitimate" is completely in the eye of the beholder.35 That such 
activity constitutes state criminality might be the view of states supporting nonproliferation 
or the implementation of sanctions. However, conversely, in the view of the sanctioned 
state, broader economic sanctions and embargoes are frequently portrayed as “illegal”, 
“unlawful”, “immoral” or unfair.36 In their view, the use of state resources to breach 
sanctions through procurement or exports is therefore likely viewed not all too different 
from other routine activities. 
 
State Resources, "Competitive Advantage" and “Competitive Adaptation” 
In cases where state resources are used to support illicit trade, the sanctions-busting 
elements of the state, exhibit, or are perceived as providing, a “competitive advantage” over 
other potential activity providers.37 In the business world, competitive advantage is defined 
as an “advantage a firm possesses over its competitors” and takes numerous forms.38 State 
resources may have advantages over use of other commercial resources. For example, 
utilizing diplomats as middlemen might have advantages over private sector brokers or 
unaffiliated arms dealers; military or state-connected transportation assets might have 
benefits over commercial providers. In the business world, competitive advantage is 
generally related to profitability.39 In relation to illicit trade, profitability sits alongside 
other factors such as the need to deceive industry, governments and intelligence agencies, 
and more broadly evade those seeking to prevent illicit transfers.40   
 
The competitive advantages held by criminal states have been discussed – especially in 
relation to territorial control. For example, state criminality allows North Korea to produce 
narcotics in large quantities because it has the territory to do so, which constitutes an 
"enforcement free environment".41 In terms of proliferation networks, Hastings’s 
geographical approach, and discussion of state resources and prerogatives also relates to 
territorial control, but in the inverse – avoiding reliance on transportation routes or 
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infrastructure which is not in the proliferating state’s control. He notes those with state 
resources can bypass commercial transportation infrastructure and unfriendly territories, 
thus making shipments less likely to be compromised.42  
 
It should be noted that decision-making regarding illicit network modus operandi is not 
necessarily top-down, and does not necessarily result from a systematic assessment of costs 
and benefits. The state resources themselves may show propensity to adapt, assume new 
roles and affect relative competitive advantage. New roles can be driven by personal profit 
or gain within the system in which they are operating. Taking embassies for example, 
noting a level of “versatility and adaptability”, Berridge has suggested that “Embassies can 
fulfil any number of subsidiary functions”, in order to cope with “changing circumstances 
abroad and a difficult climate at home”.43 In the North Korean case, since the 1960s 
embassies and diplomatic missions have been expected to “self-finance”, to send funds 
back to Pyongyang, and diplomats have been keen to supplement their relatively low 
salaries.44 This has created a spate of inventive, innovative, questionable and sometimes 
criminal schemes being run out of North Korean diplomatic missions.  
 
Efforts by governments, intelligence agencies, industry and other actors seeking to counter 
proliferation also shape the choices and decisions of those involved in these networks. 
“Competitive adaptation” refers to how groups learn and adapt in response to the actions of 
their adversaries.45 The ongoing process of competitive adaptation has been seen on both 
sides in a decades-long game of cat and mouse between proliferators and those seeking to 
stop them. The following section considers the competitive advantage of state resources, 
and how these relative advantages have evolved over time due to the process of competitive 
adaptation.  
 
State Procurement and Sales Assets: What Competitive Advantages Do They Offer?  
State assets are used in proliferation networks because they can be, and because they have 
certain specific benefits –or “competitive advantages”– over other options. The following 
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two sections consider the competitive advantages of these assets as compared to private 
sector alternatives in two main areas: First, the roles of diplomats and intelligence agencies 
in procurement and exports in breach of embargoes, relative to private sector middlemen. 
Second, state and quasi-state logistical assets to physically transfer the goods, as compared 
to private sector alternatives. The competitive advantages of these assets are not static, 
therefore these sections also consider the role of competitive adaptation. 
 
Together, these sections argue that the competitive advantage of some state assets – 
particularly in the area of logistics – has declined. The utility of procurement assets is less 
likely to change. Diplomatic assets, unlikely to decline in utility due to protocol and 
privilege, may decline as their use is recognized and if the proliferating state in question is 
diplomatically isolated by the international community. Intelligence assets may also decline 
in utility as scrutiny is focused on them, however their clandestine nature means this is less 
likely to be the case.  
 
Diplomatic Assets 
Embassies and diplomats have long played a role in illicit procurement and sales efforts. 
Pakistani procurement efforts in the 1970s saw European embassies used to acquire 
nuclear-related goods. SA Butt, allegedly an accredited diplomat, simultaneously wore “the 
hats of secretary, consultant, recruiter and distributor”, taking a central role in Pakistan’s 
procurement network, setting up front companies, coordinating the European visits and 
activities of scientists and other Pakistani nationals involved in procurement.46 He operated 
first in the Pakistani embassy in Brussels, allegedly as the “head of the science and 
technology department”.47 Later, Butt operated a small office outside of Paris, allegedly the 
Embassy’s scientific and technical section of the embassy, and just a three minute walk 
from major French nuclear company SGN.48 A separate operation was set up twenty miles 
outside of Bonn in West Germany in 1977 allegedly by another accredited diplomat –Ikram 
ul-Haq Khan– with close relations to the Pakistani Embassy in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.49 Other sources have suggested the embassy itself in Bonn was also involved.50 
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In short, Pakistan’s use of embassies in its procurement operations was “systematic” from 
the 1970s until at least the late 1990s.51 
 
North Korea has continually used diplomats and embassies to support their WMD 
programs. In the 1990s, a North Korean diplomat based at the country’s mission in Vienna 
–Yun Ho Jin– was allegedly involved in illicit procurement, facilitating North Korean trade 
delegation visits to Europe, with some technology allegedly being transferred to the 
Yongbyon nuclear research center.52 More recently, the UN panel monitoring North 
Korea’s sanctions noted diplomats based in Germany were also involved in efforts to 
acquire machine tools in the 2000s.53 As mentioned above, in 2018 a German intelligence 
official noted that the North Korean embassy in Berlin had been used to acquire missile and 
nuclear related dual-use goods over the previous two years.54 Furthermore, in the area of 
conventional arms, the UN panel has noted that diplomats of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) “or officials travelling on diplomatic or service passports” have 
helped to facilitate “numerous violations of the arms embargo”.55  
 
Examples of diplomats and embassies being involved are by no means limited to Pakistan 
and North Korea. Iran has also allegedly made frequent use of embassies and diplomats in 
its networks. For example, its Bonn embassy was used in the 1980s for procurement of 
chemical weapons related goods, and its Beijing embassy was involved in missile-related 
procurement activities in the 2000s.56  
 
Besides the embassies themselves, and departments of them, commercial interest and trade 
promotion offices, as well as their connections to state-trading companies can also be of use 
in these networks. The degree to which these offices are connected to the embassy varies – 
sometimes they are on embassy premises; sometimes those working there have diplomatic 
privileges and immunities. North Korean diplomats that travelled to Ukraine in 2011, 
seeking to gain access to “secret academic theses” from a Ukrainian rocket design bureau 
were accredited to the DPRK’s “Trade Representative Office in Belarus”.57 In the 1980s the 
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Iranian government operated three military service Procurement Offices in London to 
purchase arms in the face of US efforts to implement an arms embargo. Some of these were 
initially based on embassy property, and later moved to the National Iranian Oil Company 
building.58  
 
Embassies also have wider utility in supporting proliferation networks – much in the way 
they might support other commercial activities. It is unlikely a coincidence that arms dealer 
Michael Ranger notes that he met North Korean arms dealers “…at public places (hotels, 
restaurants and bars) in third countries where the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
maintained embassies”.59 North Korean state trading companies involved in the arms trade 
and other activities are frequently supported by North Korean embassies.60 In the Chong 
Chon Gang case, where a large shipment of arms was interdicted in Panama on route to 
North Korea, officials from the DPRK embassy in Cuba were implicated in the transfer by 
documents left on the ship, and Chinpo Shipping Company, involved in financial 
transactions, was co-located with the DPRK embassy in Singapore.61  
 
Proliferators’ have also used diplomatic bags and other immunities to enable their 
activities. Iraqi officials allegedly used diplomatic pouches to transfer cash and 
procurement directives and made use of mission vehicles with diplomatic plates to transfer 
cash.62 Pakistani officials used pouches to transfer sensitive documentation related to the 
nuclear program.63  
 
Intelligence Assets 
States frequently utilize their intelligence organizations and assets, acting through their 
embassies or otherwise, in their procurement or sales activities in breach of sanctions. The 
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), for example, was heavily involved in illicit procurement of 
dual-use and military goods for Iraq’s missile and military programs during the 1990s. 
According to the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), the IIS was used by Saddam to “undertake the 
most sensitive procurement missions”.64 IIS operatives were based in most Iraqi embassies 
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abroad under diplomatic cover and in some cases as commercial attaches, collaborating 
with the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Military Industrial Commission, Iraqi Atomic 
Energy Commission and even other countries’ intelligence agencies (notably Syria), to 
procure military and missile related goods and intangibles.65 IIS officers were purportedly 
involved in establishing and running Iraqi front companies for procurement purposes.66  
 
Other states’ networks have also made use of intelligence assets. The Reconnaissance 
General Bureau (RGB) of North Korea is allegedly involved in much of the illicit 
sanctions-busting and finance generating activity, including arms sales through front 
companies.67 Their involvement in WMD-related procurement has not been publicly 
recorded, but is certainly possible. Pakistani procurement operations across Europe in the 
1970s and 1980s, heavily involving diplomats and embassies, were allegedly “overseen by 
ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] field agents operating under the cover of diplomatic 
postings”.68 
 
In the Iranian case, rather than intelligence agencies, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) is heavily involved in illicit procurement and illicit arms exports. The UN 
Iran Panel noted in 2011 that: 
Elements of the IRGC are engaged in a wide variety of activities prohibited 
under United Nations sanctions, including procurement related to the nuclear 
and ballistic missile programmes, the smuggling of conventional arms and 
related materiel, and the establishment of front companies to facilitate transit 
of prohibited items.69  
Since the mid-1990s the IRGC has transformed beyond a military institution to also 
constitute a network of political and economic actors.70 Especially since 2005 –and spurred 
on by sanctions– the IRGC have seen a “dramatic increase in their economic importance”, 
building on their “arms imports expertise to create a vast network of shadow ports, through 




Competitive Advantages and Adaptation? 
In the above examples, diplomats and intelligence agencies are essentially playing the role 
of procurement agents, middlemen and brokers in the service of the state. These are 
potentially roles which could be, and often are, played by elements of the private sector in 
proliferation networks. What advantages and disadvantages could the use of state assets 
hold in this respect? Both diplomats and intelligence operatives share some advantages in 
this respect, both because of their state connections, and because both can be based at 
diplomatic premises.  
 
Both types of asset can allow illicit procurement or sales activities to be kept “close hold” – 
meaning a minimal number of people are aware of it. Furthermore, for the most part, these 
assets will be loyal to the state. Their will and ability to keep activities secret, will perhaps 
trump interests in generating profit which often drives private sector actors. However, it is 
not so easy to generalize. For example, Vienna-based North Korean diplomat Kim Jong 
Ryul, was involved in purchasing all types of commodities for the Pyongyang elite, taking 
a 3% personal cut of each deal. He would later fake his own death and go into hiding for 
over a decade before telling his story to journalists.72 Private sector actors can also be keen 
to keep involvement secret, to avoid punishment or to avoid losing business to competitors.  
 
Both types of asset potentially offer pre-existing resources and networks to exploit. 
Diplomatic and intelligence networks will likely be in place before the state decides to 
develop WMD, or is placed under sanction. Use of pre-existing assets could avoid drawing 
attention like newly deployed assets could. As the ISG has noted, IIS officers already 
stationed overseas were “in a good position to carry out the mission… without drawing the 
attention of the international community”.73 However, in cases where sanctions are levied 
against procurement entities and other aspects of a proliferating state’s economy, 
particularly in economies which already have limited trading links, relying on these 




The specific location of embassies and intelligence assets –in diplomatic and trading 
partners– can also be beneficial. Those in countries with strong diplomatic relationships 
could be of great use in facilitating arms transfers to or from allies. Those based in, or near 
to, key markets or those lacking oversight –for example the Pakistanis and North Koreans 
in Europe (as opposed to the US) in the 1980s and 1990s– could be of great utility in 
WMD-related procurement efforts.  
 
In the broadest sense, embassies provide “physical sanctuaries and political/ diplomatic/ 
commercial covers” for individuals involved in procurement.74 The diplomatic status also 
arguably offers an air of legitimacy, which may detract from or conceal potential illicit 
activities.75 Specific aspects of diplomatic protocol also provides advantages. The 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) codified long-standing protocols on 
the immunity of diplomats on the basis of “functional necessity”: on the grounds that 
diplomats cannot fulfil their function without these privileges.76 Diplomats are inviolable, 
not liable to arrest; exempt from the jurisdiction of the receiving state; and only the sending 
state may waive this immunity.77 The immunity received depends on the type of embassy 
staff in question – diplomats receive the highest level, followed by technical staff.78 The 
specific manner in which status is determined is inconsistent between states.79 In theory, if 
discovered, diplomats cannot be prosecuted for efforts to illicitly transfer technology to 
their state program. The VCDR does, however, allow the receiving state to declare the 
ambassador or other members of the mission persona non-grata (PNG).80 Thus far, there is 
no evidence to suggest that a diplomat has been declared PNG for proliferation-related 
activities.  
 
The provisions of the VCDR also potentially provide other opportunities to conceal or 
transfer incriminating goods. For example, diplomatic premises (embassies for example), 
diplomat’s residences, and even mission vehicles are immune from search.81 Diplomatic 
bags –packages bearing “visible external marks of their character” containing documents or 
articles for official use– may not be opened on route back to the home capital, other 
diplomatic residences or when transiting third countries.82 These have been used 
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successfully and unsuccessfully to illicitly smuggle a wide range of items –drugs, 
commodities, art, weapons– and even people.83 That diplomatic bags could have utility in 
proliferation-related transfers was recognized early in the nuclear age: a member of the UN 
International Law Commission noted in 1957, “Although the smuggling of the vital parts of 
atomic bombs in the diplomatic bag was still confined to the realms of fiction, there was 
nothing to prevent its becoming an actual fact”.84 In cases where abuse of the diplomatic 
bag is possible, the host country has few options: protesting to the mission in question 
potentially causing a crisis, or terminating the diplomatic relationship completely.85 
 
The key competitive advantages of intelligence agencies lie in their established networks, 
and the skillset held by their operatives – from establishing clandestine networks, 
clandestine communications, counterintelligence activities and covert action, right down to 
the tradecraft of its individual operatives. In some sense, intelligence agencies are the most 
obvious organ of the state to involve in covert efforts to procure or sell technology from 
overseas. The procurement aspect has significant parallels with existing intelligence 
missions pursued by certain intelligence agencies, such as industrial espionage.  
 
Processes of competitive adaptation have likely changed the way states use these resources, 
although this is difficult to prove. Global measures to counter illicit WMD-related exports 
have developed significantly – especially over the past 14 years since UNSCR 1540 made 
export controls and other related tools mandatory for states.86 Private sector actors do still 
possess advantages: diplomats and intelligence officers do not necessarily have the same 
understanding of WMD and military technologies, the relevant markets and suppliers that 
those in the private sector often do. This may make procurement less efficient, resulting in 
bad deals or procurement of the wrong merchandise, for example. Use of private sector 
middlemen could also allow for a degree of “plausible deniability” regarding state 




State assets –embassies and intelligence operatives– have traditionally been a target for 
other intelligence agencies. This is especially the case for embassies and declared 
intelligence officers – declared assets that lack the anonymity of the private sector. In 
recent years in the North Korean case, there has been a heightened awareness of these and 
other illicit activities conducted by embassies, with the number of missions and their size 
being reduced by host governments.87 Increased scrutiny of North Korean embassies as 
early as the mid-1990s is credited with Ho Jin Yun’s move away from the Vienna mission, 
and the continuation of his activities through state-owned Namchongang Trading 
Company, in the late 1990s.88 This case suggests advantages for Yun’s activity being 
undertaken through a quasi-state asset, rather than under diplomatic cover. Perhaps his 
cover in Vienna was blown, or his change in status may be due to other factors entirely. 
 
State Transportation Assets: What Competitive Advantages Do They Offer?  
State-owned and state-connected maritime and air transportation assets have frequently 
been seen in proliferation networks. Those most clearly linked to the state are military 
assets. Pakistan’s procurement activities in the 1970s and 1980s involved use of military 
transportation – for example, a particularly large shipment of a gasification and 
solidification unit, used in the uranium conversion process was moved from Switzerland to 
Pakistan by a series of Pakistani Air Force C-130 aircraft.89 President Musharraf allegedly 
conceded that many of the transfers undertaken by Khan’s sales network utilized similar 
military transport aircraft.90 From the 1990s and into the 2000s, these aircraft were also 
allegedly utilized in Pakistan’s import of missile related components from North Korea.91  
 
Other state-connected transportation assets –for example national merchant fleets– have 
been used to transport proliferation-related and military goods. North Korea’s merchant 
fleet, limited and highly fragmented in terms of apparent private ownership, is closely 
connected to the state.92 Several cases have been seen where North Korea used North 
Korean-flagged, owned and operated ships to transport large and sensitive cargoes. This 
was seemingly more common prior to the initiation of the UN sanctions regime in 2006. 
For example the DPRK-flagged vessel the Kuwolsan was interdicted in 1999, and the 
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DPRK-owned (Cambodian-flagged) So San in 2002, both carrying Scud missiles and 
related goods to Yemen, and Pakistan or Libya, respectively.93 In 2009, the Kang Nam-1, a 
DPRK-owned and flagged vessel, attempted to transfer a suspicious cargo to Myanmar, but 
was forced to turn back by US and international pressure.94 
 
More recent efforts to transport goods in breach of sanctions have, likely as a result of a 
process of “competitive adaptation”, sought to make North Korean involvement less 
obvious. These efforts have included using flags of convenience, and complex networks of 
entities to complicate ownership. The MV Light also attempted to make a delivery to 
Myanmar in 2011. Under pressure from a US Naval vessel, the Belize-flagged, and China- 
and Hong Kong-managed and owned vessel returned to North Korea as the Kang Nam-1 
did two years prior.95 Evidence later emerged that the ship was DPRK-owned and flagged 
until 2006, and that when the US Navy requested an inspection in 2011, the shipmaster 
refused to be boarded noting it to be a “vessel of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea”.96  
 
In a second case, the DPRK-flagged and -owned Chong Chon Gang was inspected by 
Panamanian authorities in 2013, and revealed to be carrying 25 shipping containers of arms 
hidden under 10,000 tons of sugar. The vessel was allegedly transporting the weapons from 
Cuba to North Korea for refurbishment. Despite the DPRK-ownership and operation, it was 
noted by the UN panel that: 
 
The employment of so many role-players in support of the ship suggests a 
network of entities, centrally managed, working together to deflect scrutiny 
in order to evade sanctions by minimizing the visibility of the Democratic 




Iran’s merchant fleet –mostly composed of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines 
(IRISL)– despite being highly fragmented in terms of ownership, also has significant state 
connections.98 Iranian use of state-connected logistical assets to transport goods in breach 
of sanctions also appears to exhibit signs of competitive adaptation. IRISL took steps to 
conceal their activities following its US designation in 2008, and designation of three 
subsidiaries by the UN in 2010, reflagging and renaming ships, and transferring them to 
new ownership.99 Between 2008 and 2012, the around 130 IRISL-linked vessels saw 
changes in ownership 220 times, were renamed 150 times, and reflagged over 90 times.100 
IRISL was reportedly involved in sanctions violations in “several cases” before 2010.101 
Non-Iranian flagged vessels were also chartered by IRISL to “conceal” illicit activity.102 
 
North Korean, Iranian and Pakistani commercial airlines have also been involved in 
transportation of WMD-related and sanctioned goods. State-owned Air Koryo and Iran Air 
have allegedly transported shipments of arms, and been implicated in proliferation related 
transfers.103 Air Koryo has a fairly limited ability to lift heavy cargo, so in cases where 
large shipments of very sensitive or valuable items are involved, non-scheduled or 
chartered flights may be used.104 Other privately-owned Iranian airlines allegedly have also 
been implicated in the transfer of arms, possibly with some level of knowledge, and at least 
with connections to the Iranian regime.105 Pakistan International Airlines was also allegedly 
used to transfer WMD-related materials, including uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to Libya, 
and in other unspecified cases involving particularly “sensitive items” in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.106 
 
More recently, evidence has increasingly suggested that commercial transportation has 
been used in lieu of state-controlled transportation assets. Particularly, containerized 
shipping has been used to move WMD-related goods and weapons in breach of sanctions. 
A 2012 report notes that since the mid-2000s, Iranian and North Korean efforts to import 
and export goods have increasingly involved shipments being concealed in containers, 
carried by major liner shipping, foreign owned and flagged, and not under North Korean or 




In the case of North Korea, largely isolated from the major liner routes, shipments are 
transported to regional ports –especially the nearby Dalian– for transshipment.108 Both Iran 
and North Korea developed methods to mislabel and physically conceal the cargo within 
containers –for example, behind bags of cement, or powdered milk– and also to conceal its 
origins after the first transshipment in a foreign port.109 Similarly, recently uncovered 
networks transferring dual-use goods to North Korea from China – alongside significant 
quantities of other commodities – have involved large Chinese commercial operators 
providing procurement and logistical services together.110 
 
Competitive Advantage and Adaptation?  
State-connected shipping has some advantages like state procurement assets above: for 
example, the ability to keep close hold and secretive, without involving a broader range of 
commercial actors. However, as Hastings argues, the use of state-assets also allows for 
more direct routing, potentially avoiding hostile territory and interdiction at third country 
logistical hubs such as ports and airports.111 The decision between state assets or state-
connected transportation assets, or their commercial equivalents, may also be dictated by 
limitations in capability or available commercial routes. For example, North Korea has little 
long-range air cargo capability in its military and Air Koryo, and is not directly connected 
to the main liner shipping routes.  
 
A more recent shift to commercial alternatives may have been driven both by perceived 
competitive advantages, and the need to adapt. Use of regular commercial services and 
containerized shipping reduces transportation costs.112 While it has been argued that 
proliferators value secrecy over cost concerns, often taking unnecessarily circuitous routes, 
information obtained by the UN Panel during their investigation into arms dealer Michael 
Ranger suggests that the DPRK “looks carefully at the bottom line” including 





Several factors have likely led proliferators to adapt their transportation methods in 
response to efforts to counter these networks. Challenges experienced, as illustrated for 
example by the unsuccessful interdiction of the So San, where the US failed to prevent the 
missiles from reaching Yemen, have resulted in tools such as the 2004 Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI). PSI seeks to facilitate interdictions at sea, and increased scrutiny 
on air and shipping lines connected to proliferating states. Sanctions on shipping companies 
and airlines have also meant increased scrutiny of these transportation methods. The UN 
Iran Panel has alleged that commercial transportation has been adopted by proliferators 
because of sanctions, both on domestic shipping companies and specific vessels.114 
Proliferators have embraced the anonymity afforded by hundreds of millions of container 
movements annually, in a similar manner to drug trafficking organizations’ use of 
containerized cargo.115 The UN North Korea Panel has noted that containerized cargo is 
“most effective for the concealment of illicit items”.116  
 
 
Conclusion: Countering State Proliferation Networks 
The use of state resources – diplomatic, intelligence and logistical assets – in proliferation 
networks is prevalent, yet also under explored in the existing literature. This article has 
sought to contextualize their use, providing some conceptual treatment of these aspects of 
proliferation networks. It has argued that states’ use of these assets lies between state 
criminality and the routine use of these assets by all states around the world for customary 
national security purposes. It has further sought to develop and use the concepts of 
“competitive advantage” and “competitive adaptation” to systematically explore the use of 
these assets. In doing so, it has considered the benefits and challenges for the use of these 
assets relative to private sector equivalents.  
 
The article finds that the advantages of using these assets are not a clear-cut as might be 
thought, as all these specific types of assets have significant downsides, especially as a 
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proliferating state’s activities are uncovered, and scrutiny increases. Assets on the 
procurement side –diplomatic and intelligence– will likely have more durable utility than 
those on the logistical side, whose utility already appears to have declined. Of diplomatic 
and intelligence assets, intelligence assets are likely to have more enduring value, because 
of the clandestine nature of their work and networks. Commercial transportation means –
and particularly containerized shipping– seem to be becoming more prominent in 
transferring proliferation-sensitive goods.  
 
The conclusions of this article, besides providing insights into the modus operandi of 
proliferation networks, have implications for nonproliferation efforts. These state-
connected aspects of proliferation networks are amongst the most difficult to counter, being 
highly secretive, allowing activities to be held close by the proliferating state, and with 
exceptional sensitivities surrounding diplomatic privileges. Efforts to counter the state-
connected elements of illicit procurement networks have been, and are likely to be, 
intelligence-led. Despite their clandestine nature, open source tools have shown great utility 
across the board. For example, the UN Panels of Experts, which rely heavily on open 
source information, have been able to uncover significant proliferation-related activities 
undertaken using state-connected assets. Opportunities are also afforded by open source 
data for mapping the illicit networks in the often small commercial and diplomatic circles 
surrounding embassies, and in tracking maritime traffic.117 More emphasis should be placed 
by non-governmental researchers on utilizing these capabilities to further explore these 
networks.  
 
While efforts to prosecute state-connected elements of the networks are unlikely to be 
successful, other steps such as designations, reducing the sizes of diplomatic missions, and 
undertaking at-sea interdictions, can have a significant disruptive effect on their activities. 
The US disruptive counterproliferation toolset has been expanded in recent years, and 
merits further consideration.118 Are there further lessons which can be drawn across from 
efforts to counter other types of transnational crime – for example narcotics trafficking or 
cyber-crime – which also often involve entities with state connections? Furthermore, the 
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apparent shift towards commercial and containerized shipping, potentially provides 
opportunities as well as challenges. Greater efforts to engage the private sector involved in 
transportation, besides the more traditional engagement activities with dual-use and 
military exporters, could also be beneficial.  
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